Table of Contents
Errata
Calendar
Part I. French Accounts
Chapter I. Extract from the Memoirs of Baron de Marbot
Chapter II. Extract from Life of Napoleon by Baron Jomini
Part II. French Documents. Period from August 26 to October 31, 1806
Chapter III. Preparations for War, 26 August to 27 September
Chapter IV. Preparations for Maneuver, 28 September, to 7 October
Chapter V. The Maneuver, 8 to 14 October
Chapter VI. The Pursuit, 15 to 24 October
Chapter VII. The Pursuit, 25 to 31 October
Part III. German Accounts
Chapter VIII. German Order of Battle, by Col. F.N. Maude
Chapter IX. Extracts from "Notes on Prussia during the Catastrophe of 1806," by Clausewitz
Chapter X. "Prince August’s Battalion in the Battle of Prenzlau," by Clausewitz
Part IV. French Documents. The End of the French Pursuit. Period November 1 to 10, 1806.
Chapter XI. End of the Pursuit, 1 to 10 November.
Appendix I. Information concerning prominent people mentioned in text.
Appendix II. Documents not included in body of text.
Excerpt from Chapter X:
Prince August's Battalion at the Battle of Prenzlau
By
Von Clausewitz
Prince August's grenadier battalion, several hundred men strong had been organized at Magdeburg from the remnants of the Rheinbaben grenadier battalion, and on October 26th, it left Neu-Ruppin, 600 strong. By a continuous march to Schonermark, on October 28th, during which the troops had been led from one assembly place to another, and had not received the least sign of any rations, the battalion had been reduced to 240 men. The balance had been left in rear, exhausted with hunger and fatigue. We formed the rear guard in the march towards Prenzlau. When at daybreak we wished to pass through the village of Gustow, half a mile from Prenzlau, we were informed from the front that the rear guard should close up; at the same time, several hundred wagons which during the night had gotten into the interval between us and the main body without our having noted it, suddenly left the road, so that there was a large empty space in front of us. We continued to march towards Prenzlau as rapidly as possible. General Hersfeld, our division commander, sent Count Stolberg of the King's regiment once again to the rear, to hasten our march. Prince August directed me to proceed forward towards Prenzlau with Count Stolberg, to see how things were. When we had arrived at several thousand paces from Prenzlau we saw alongside of the road three of four hostile cavalry regiments who seemed to be about to throw themselves on the King's regiment, which was just reaching the gates of Prenzlau. Count Stolberg said to me: "We have not time to lose, come with me. The others are all cut off." I replied that our duty here separated us, that he could regain his regiment in time by galloping, but that I would wait for Prince August at this place. I waited a moment longer, watching a fight that a company of the Dohna Grenadier Battalion and the Prittwitz Dragoon regiment were having with the hostile cavalry. The regiment was repulsed by the enemy across the road on which we were, and then into Prenzlau. I saw the disorder that took place at the entrance of Prenzlau where cavalry, infantry, friends and enemies were mixed up. I returned to the Prince who arrived on the ground with his battalion and I reported to him as to what I had seen. We discussed what there was to be done and we decided the best thing to do was to march away towards the left, it being believed we could not count much upon our men, and particularly because we had not learned by experience that a battalion of infantry can hold its own in the midst of hostile cavalry; we hoped that thanks to everybody being busy around Prenzlau we would not soon be noticed. We now noticed for the first time that in rear of us was a cavalry regiment, the Quitzow cuirassiers. While we were still on the road, we received some artillery fire from hostile batteries that had taken position on our right flank, on the other side of a small stream coming from Boitzenburg. The few rounds fired dispersed the Quitzow regiment like a handful of chaff thrown on the ground. We turned the head of the column to the left, crossed a small stream and a vegetable garden. As soon as we were across, we formed a square and continued the march in this manner following down the Uecker, having this stream a thousand paces to our flank, and moving in the general direction of Ellingen. Prince August strongly reproached Colonel Cospoth, commanding the Quitzow regiment on the conduct of his regiment. But the latter himself was very indignant and took all possible pains to reassemble his command by use of bugle calls. He succeeded in again uniting about one hundred troopers, one squadron, and we soon lost sight of the remainder. They assembled some distance away, and joined General Bila, who with 15 squadrons was still in rear. Prince August sought to require Colonel Cospoth to remain near him, which he promised to do, but naturally he did nothing of the kind.
The battalion continued its march for half an hour, when we saw appear on our left, behind a line of very flat heights, three or four squadrons of cavalry, marching in the same direction as we were. At first we supposed that these were troops of the Quitzow regiment, who had fled in that direction, but noticing immediately afterwards that a still larger number were following in rear of us, we soon recognized them as the enemy, and that it was necessary to defend ourselves. The battalion had only 7 officers, and as we have already said, 240 men. The Prince exalted them to make an honorable resistance, to be calm, not to lose their heads and particularly not to fire before receiving orders to do so. Some minutes later, the hostile cavalry advanced. The battalion executed "halt - ready," and the men were then cautioned: "Do not fire." I thought for a moment to myself of the battle of Minden where the French cavalry charged two Hanover battalions; and when these failed to fire at the usual distance, they came gradually from a gallop to a trot and finally from a trot to a walk. Exactly the same thing happened here. The French dragoons advanced at a gallop, and we could see with what anxiety they awaited the moment when they would receive our fire; when at a range of 100 paces they had received no fire, they more and more drew in on their horses, and finally were approaching us only at a slow trot. Fire was ordered at 30 paces; many fell, the rest lay down in rear of their horses' necks, wheeled about and fled. Now all our men were well in hand. They seemed thoroughly astonished at the great success of the maneuver which they had often practiced on the drill ground and which they had usually considered as a sort of play. Even when a hostile dragoon, who had been dismounted immediately in front of the battalion, and disengaging himself from his dead horse ran away as fast as possible, the contrast between this anxious flight and the savage appearance of this dragoon with helmet and horse hair plume, made such an impression on the men that everybody laughed. We continued then on our march, not much time elapsed before a second charge was repulsed in the same manner. When we took up the march again, we found ourselves barred by several squadrons and the rest followed us so closely that we were never sure but that they were not going to charge. We stopped again, sent out some of the skirmishers which we still had, and fired several musket shots at these squadrons. Results were immediate; they gave way in all directions, the road became free, and we were able to continue the march. After this, at intervals there were five attacks; during this time, we observed 14 hostile squadrons consisting in part of Beaumont's division, as we afterwards ascertained, but they were without artillery.
After having continued our retreat in this manner for about half an hour, we ascertained from a messenger, captured in a village (Schoenwerder) that we would find no crossing over the Uecker until we reached Pasewalk, and that the banks of this stream were not practicable on account of marshes and ditches. We saw that we would have to fight over a distance of four miles; it was necessary to consider lack of ammunition and the possibility of exhausting the strength and morale of the troops. The Prince therefore decided to march with his battalion preferably through the marshes of the Uecker, satisfied that it would be generally possible for the infantry to obtain an advantage in such terrain, however bad it might appear. The hostile cavalry could not reach us there, and the only question was to reach Pasewalk at the cost of great physical efforts. Consequently, in spite of the advice of the peasant, we changed our direction of march, and we were glad we did so, when we advanced without interference about one league, although with great difficulty, while the hostile cavalry, that followed along the high ground on our flank, could only look at us, a part of them dismounted, and they appeared to have abandoned us. But the terrain became more and more difficult; frequently we met large ditches full of water and so deep that the water came up under the arms. About 100 of our men fell out in this bad ground, lacking strength to proceed through the marsh. We had had to leave all our saddle horses behind; only the Prince had been able to keep a fine English horse of remarkable strength. This was the horse on which his brother, Prince Louis, had been killed at Saalfeld, and the blood stains from this brave Prince were still visible on the saddle. But during the violent exertions that this animal made to get out of the marsh, he escaped and jumped into the Uecker, where it swam alongside of us. We sought in vain to rescue it with the use of long halberts which some of our noncommissioned officers still carried. This was the more cruel as the Prince with the pride of his race, had decided in case of misfortune to fight saber in hand. The hostile artillery now arrived and for some time fired shells at us, as the marsh was too wide for shrapnel fire; the fire did not have any serious effect. We would have continued to advance in this manner individually, and we would probably have thus saved ourselves, if after crossing a large ditch full of water that we had the greatest difficulty in getting over, the ground had not become more solid. This allowed the hostile cavalry to approach us in considerable numbers, although only at a walk. When we arrived on this solid ground, the men were called upon to reform the square, and I wish to particularly mention Captain Schwerin. This officer like a service watch, had been noted in time of peace for regulated activity, very methodical and generally considered pedantic; I say that I wish to think of this man because, a rare thing, he maintained the same calm, methodical manner under most extreme danger. He could not console himself, because the square was not reformed. But the men had used their muskets to assist themselves in crossing the ditches; the greater number had been in the water up to their arms, their cartridge boxes had become wet as well as the ammunition within them. They foresaw the impossibility of defending themselves; they threw down their arms and voluntarily permitted the hostile cavalry to take them. The Prince had nothing else to do, and he accepted the fate of his men. At first, his sword, his star of the Black Eagle, and his watch were taken from the Prince. But Major General Beaumont soon arrived and these articles were returned to him. On the request of the Prince, orders were given to look for his horse that was soon brought up.
The number of prisoners that the enemy took here might have amounted to a hundred. The others were still in the swamp, and when they saw what had happened to us, a part turned around and returned towards Prenzlau. We had only had a few wounded, among which one officer, caused by the hostile dragoons firing with their carbines after their charges, while following our retreat. We were unable to determine the effect of the artillery fire, and particularly as to the last rounds, which were shrapnel fire. The enemy acknowledge the loss of about 80 killed and wounded. When one knows that cavalry under such circumstances has but slight losses, this number does not appear unreasonable.
During the fight, the Prince had sent one of Schimmelpfennig's hussars who happened to be near us, and also my orderly, along the Uecker, in hopes that they might meet some detachment that might rescue us. Neither of these returned. We were surprised not to see our troops leave Prenzlau on the other side of the Uecker. We therefore supposed that they had so departed very rapidly while we were having our violent fight. The Prince learned with astonishment and with the greatest chagrin that Prince Hohenlohe had surrendered.
We found ourselves between the villages of Bandelow and Nechlin, at a full mile and a half from Prenzlau, to which we were led back, because the Grand Duke of Berg had to decide what to do with the Prince; we arrived there at 4:00 P.M. While we were leaving the ground where we had been captured, we saw French cavalry making useless efforts to capture some men who had remained in the swamp, who repulsed them with musket shots. General Beaumont then suggested to the Prince to order these men not to fire any more, as they were included in the capture of their chief. The Prince made this noble reply: "These men are more lucky than I am. They are no longer under my orders, and I can only rejoice that they defend themselves like brave soldiers." A part of these men did in fact have the good fortune of crossing the Uecker at a narrow place on a plank that a swimmer obtained from the other side, and they thus escaped towards Stettin.
At Prenzlau the Prince was conducted to the Grand Duke of Berg who was in an embroidered marshal's uniform, and who was making up a report to the Emperor on a sheet of open paper with very large oblique letters and a miserable hand writing. He said some flattering things to the Prince, and gave him to understand that he would leave that night for Berlin under guard of a high officer.
During this journey they arrived in the morning at Oranienburg where the postmistress, who did not know the Prince, asked whether it were true that all the Guards had been captured. The Prince only replied with a sad look: "Ah! Good God," she said, "let us hope that they have been captured and everything is over!"
I mention this matter as it illustrates the spirit and the ideas of the people. We arrived at Berlin about noon, where in the midst of the most contrary sentiments, we were the object of the people's curiosity. We were soon taken to the chateau where we found the Imperial Headquarters assembled in the King's chambers. The Prince was immediately brought before the Emperor; as to me, I was allowed to remain with my much worn uniform in the midst of the brilliant uniforms of the Emperor's aides, who seemed slightly to dislike me. The Emperor sent back the Prince after about 5 minutes, and after having told him that he could remain at Berlin with his parents. However, two months later, he was sent to Nancy by orders of General Clarke, Governor of Berlin.
I acquired the conviction during this little cavalry fight, that infantry is very strong against cavalry. The square that we formed, was according to the old method, a 3-rank square. The men were so weak physically and morally by the lost battle, by a constant retreat of 14 days, by frightful marches, and lack of rations; the French cavalry were so excited by continuous successes; and the odds of 240 infantry to 1500 cavalry were so unfavorable, that the situation in which this infantry found itself, can certainly be considered as very bad. The calmness maintained by its chief and his officers, and their continuous caution not to fire, and consequently retaining the fire until late, caused the success.
I am persuaded that it is not in the nature of a cavalryman to wish to have himself killed in such cases by a musket shot. It is usually believed that the hostile cavalry, at the moment when they actually turned about could have charged without danger. But this is a false idea. Infantry fire under any form used (with us we have thought of battalion volleys, that fronts attacked should fire at the same time, and that in serious cases, this is the only possible manner), does not strike down the cavalry so suddenly, but that they by continuing to advance do not always receive many shots at very short range, in the last case as is said, ŕ bout pourtant, and it is these shots at point blank ranges which everybody fears. In other cases, in which we have formed infantry squares, we could certainly count upon the fact that the infantry was no longer in order, and had already commenced to weaken before the brave cavalry had had the time to turn around, or that it had fired too soon at between 200 and 100 paces, and that at the moment where the cavalry was very close to the square none or little fire came from it. If horse artillery prepares a charge the effect will be almost always decisive against troops with slight military spirit, but in fact it amounts to little against French troops as the author knows from experience. I therefore say: Consideration being given to the effects of artillery, the best and most effective formations for attacking infantry, will always be to charge in echelon in several lines, in such manner that the first charge will be immediately followed by a second. This cannot be done unless the squadrons are divided into platoons and this is so much disliked by captains that this method of attack is not general.