Excerpt regarding Borodino:

Murat is also attacked by the officer of the palace. He, it appears, was afflicted with the same disease as the Emperor, that of refusing all good advice. He commands a charge to be made; one of his aides-de-camp informs him that a deep ravine exists between our horsemen and the enemy, but "Murat, in a greater fury than ever, insisted that they must march, and if there was any obstacle, they would see it. He then made use of insulting phrases, to urge them on." It must be allowed that the French army would have been an extraordinary one, if the Emperor and his generals had been as M. de Ségur has pleased to describe them. What he says of our officers, that they were abused in order to force them to their duty, is so marvelous that we are led to believe the officer of the palace does not regard himself as a French officer.

The author, adhering rigidly to his system, figures to us the Emperor "advancing at a still slower pace than the day before, and so completely absorbed," that he did not know whither he was going, fortunately he was warned that he would fall into the hands of the enemy, on which he halted.

As if what we have already undergone was not enough, "the Russian autumn now triumphed over him." To explain this passage, M. de Ségur gives us another tempest, which never occurred except in his own brain, but which, according to him, chilled Napoleon, and caused in him "a burning fever, which dried up his blood and oppressed his spirits." If all those who had been around the Emperor on the day of battle were dead, and that there remained no recollection of this day, our historian might speak of this depression, this burning fever, with his usual confidence in the credulity of his readers. But whilst a great number of individuals, such as his secretaries, physicians, officers, still live, whilst these persons are fully aware that Napoleon was in his usual state of health, labored with his ordinary activity, and broke down several horses, when they can attest that it was only on the night of the 7^th and 8^th that he was seized with a loss of voice, caused by the exertions he used on the eve of, and on the day of the battle, how can M. de Ségur dare to state circumstances which so many witnesses can disprove?

"Some of our troops entered the town for the purpose of passing through it in pursuit of the enemy, and others to plunder and find lodgings for themselves." The author should have informed us with which party he marched: was it with the first? Although he has hitherto forced us to admire the admirable order in which the Russians retreated, he is compelled to avow that they left an immense number of their wounded in the city, which, however, did not prevent them from setting it on fire. It is true he has an excuse ready for them: "their humanity had given way to the desire of firing on the first French they saw enter."

The account of the brave action of the voltigeurs of the 33d raises a strong desire to ascertain the name of the gallant officer who commanded them, but the author does not mention it; we will supply this omission, in stating that his name was Callier; he had under his command the company of grenadiers, and the 3d company of fusiliers, (Captain Sabatier,) forming at the most 100 men; these two companies belonged to the first battalion of the 33d of Friant’s division.

Notwithstanding the confession which escaped from M. de Ségur, respecting the number of the Russian wounded, (which did not prevent them from setting fire to the city, where these unfortunate troops were lying,) he adopts his former plan, in asserting that on the two following days, "without finding a single person or thing by which to discover the Russian army." He appears to have forgotten that all the villages, as well on the road as in the neighborhood, were filled with wounded, marking the bloody retreat of this army.

The Emperor, as he had promised in his proclamation, calculated on resting his army at Moscow, to repair the losses he had experienced, as well by the march as by the various battles, and to complete the different corps. But whilst he was making arrangements to bring up reinforcements of men and artillery, M. de Ségur makes use of the circumstance to say that "his mind was weakened," and to lament his distress.

Marshal Davout, according to our author, requests the Emperor to deprive Murat of the command of the advance guard, and to invest him with it; and M. de Ségur appears to censure Napoleon in permitting the King of Naples to retain the command, when he was aware of his "audacious and inexhaustible ardor." What can be wished for more, in the commander of an advance guard, pursuing an enemy’s army, than "an audacious and inexhaustible ardor?"

But Napoleon learns "that the vanguard was already within two days march of Moscow. That great name, and the great hopes which he attached to it, revived his strength, and on the 12^th of September, he was sufficiently recovered to set out in a carriage in order to join his vanguard."

The author insinuates that the Emperor was ill, which forced him to halt at Mojaisk. The loss of voice with which Napoleon was attacked on the 8^th, is an event likely to happen from great fatigue; it is an extremely probable occurrence, after four nights passed in bivouac, the 4^th near Gridnewow, the 5^th and 6^th, on the heights of Borodino, and the 7^th on the field of battle. The author has nevertheless based upon this loss of voice all the fables which he relates of the illness of the Emperor, for which he has prepared us for the opening of the campaign, and which he is about to extend to the termination of the expedition. He has said himself, that from the 8^th Napoleon traversed the field of battle, dispensing his cares on the wounded, whether French or Russians, which proves that his indisposition must have been slight. But it was not the cause of his remaining at Mojaisk, reason of the highest importance detained him there. After so sanguinary a battle, the general-in-command has many things to occupy him, a multitude of orders to give.

In taking an account of his losses, and of the resources which remain, so important after so great employment of them, to gather provisions, to take measures that every regulation was attended to, to procure information of the enemy, to make himself acquainted with his movements and intentions, above all, when the reports of the advance guard, and information from prisoners, gave him reason to expect a second battle;* such were objects that occupied every moment of Napoleon’s time, and truly the vigilance of his active and penetrating mind, was not at fault.**

When the Emperor received the report of General Lariboisiere, stating that the greater part of the ammunition consumed at the battle of Moskowa, had been replaced by that brought up from the intermediate depots, he left Mojaisk to join his advance guard, in order to be prepared if the enemy should offer battle. It would be believed from the statement of M. de Ségur, that he was obliged to make use of his carriage. Never was this victorious hero so strangely caricatured, what is the motive for a supposition, which is destroyed by the incontrovertible testimony of facts and persons? Does the author believe in his error, or is it the echo of hatred and prejudice? Let the reader judge for himself.

*This was the case, as the enemy appeared disposed to give us battle before Moscow, form which the French army was only five days march. It was then that the Emperor wrote to the Duke of Belluno to direct the battalions, squadrons, and stragglers, coming up, on Smolensk, in order to proceed form thence to Moscow.

** Amid the numberless orders issued by the Emperor from Mojaisk, the following letter written by himself, immediately after his arrival at his quarters, proves that the disease with which M. de Ségur supposed him attacked, had not benumbed his faculties.

For the Major General.  Mojaisk, 9^th September, 1812.

Let inspection be made of the city, and trace a redoubt to command the passage. Construct two bridges over the Moskowa. Write to Prince Eugene to hasten to Rouza, and construct bridges over the Serguiewow, to collect as many cattle and provisions as possible, and gain all the information he can. Write to the Prince of Eckmülh to occupy Borisow, and to collect provisions and information. To the Duke of Elchingen, to march his corps to Mojaisk, to-morrow. Leave the Duke of Abrantes to guard the field of battle.