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Table of Contents Introduction
Book The First.
Book The Second.
Book The Third.
Book The Fourth.
Book The Fifth.
Book The Sixth.
Excerpt from the Battle of Wachau (16 October 1813) The Attack About six o’clock in the morning, of the 16th of October, the troops were assembled, and about eight o’clock the attack commenced. Kleist, advancing with the left wing, carried the village of Mark Kleberg. Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with the center, marched upon the village of Wachau, and his tirailleurs partially obtained possession of it, and of the little wood adjoining. Prince Gorczakof, with the right wing, had farther to march, and directing his attention chiefly to the attack on Liebertwolkwitz, he could not afford the support and protection to the right center that were expected from him. Klenau, who was so far off to the right as to be entirely disconnected from the corps of Wittgenstein, made, nevertheless, an animated attack on Liebertwolkwitz, and, at first, met with some success. As soon as Napoleon observed, from the hill of Liebertwolkwitz, these movements of attack, he appears to have considered that point the key of his position, and to have directed his attention first to its security. He sent for a part of the corps of Macdonald, and one half of his young guard, under the command of Mortier, to support Lauriston; in the meantime, trusting the defenses of the Pleisse to Poniatowski, and that of Wachau, to Victor. This force, which he directed and encouraged in person, sufficed to repulse General Klenau’s attack, though not without a brave resistance on the part of the Austrians; and he ultimately gained possession of a part of the wood of the University. Klenau was now effectively disunited from the remainder of the Allied line; Liebertwolkwitz was secured, and Napoleon turned his attention to the center, where the Russians appeared to be gaining an advantage. To support Victor he brought up the other two divisions of the Guard, under the command of Oudinot, and placed his reserve artillery on the commanding ground, behind Wachau, while the cavalry of his right wing advanced, supported by squares of infantry, to attack the Russian left. The want of force sufficient to make any impression on an enemy so powerful and so well posted, had already been felt by the Allies; and the Emperor Alexander had sent to the Field Marshal to urge him to move some Austrian troops to support the attack. Though the division of Bianchi was at length ordered to march, the distance at which the Austrian infantry was posted from the active part of the engagement, rendered it impossible for them to afford any prompt assistance; but the Austrian cavalry hastened to the scene of action, led by General Nostitz, and arrived at Goslewitz, in time to meet the enemy’s cavalry, which, supported by Augereau’s squares of infantry, had gained possession of the plain, and threatened to separate the allied center from the left wing. In several brilliant charges the Austrian cavalry gained the advantage, and at length drove the enemy’s cavalry off the field, preventing, perhaps, worse mischief than had already befallen Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, from the overwhelming force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that Napoleon had directed against him. As on all other occasions, Prince Eugene here showed his usual coolness and ability; but his task had been difficult, and his means inadequate. Now, hard pressed by a superior enemy, he was obliged to retire across an open country, over ground that was disadvantageous to him; his left flank molested by a powerful and enterprising cavalry; his right entirely "en l’air," – for the division of Prince Gorczakof had gone away towards the wood of the University, to take part in the attack on Liebertwolkwitz. It is not surprising that his division did not accomplish its retreat without losing upwards of a thousand men dead upon the field; but it maintained to the last that stern discipline, incapable of panic, which distinguishes the Russian infantry on every emergency. At length, the Prince and his division, retiring slowly covered by skirmishers, reached the farm of Auenhayn, where General Raeffskoi, with the Russian grenadiers, stood in reserve, and was prepared to defend the post; to receive the attacking columns of Victor and Oudinot, and stay their further progress. The Prussians, under the command of Kleist, in the meantime, held their ground at Mark-Kleberg; and the arrival of the Austrian cavalry having secured the connection between the left wing and the center, the allied line then stood with its right on Gossa, and its left wing somewhat thrown forward at an angle. The Austrian division of General Bianchi, which had followed the cavalry, at length arrived at Gröbern, and proceeded to relieve the division of Kleist, at Mark-Kleberg, which became his support. The allied line had now gained power sufficient to resist all attacks against its left and center. The right of the center, however, was not equally well protected; and, at this period of the action, which might have been about four o’clock in the afternoon, the village of Gossa did not appear to be occupied. If it were so, it could only have been by the Russian brigade of General Pirch. Excepting two regiments of light cavalry, the dragoons, and the lancers of the Russian guard, there were no troops in the plain between that village and the right of the troops occupied with the defense of Auenhayn. Murat saw this weak point, and prepared to take advantage of it. The Emperor Alexander had also turned his attention to it; and, to secure it, he had sent for the reserves, both cavalry and infantry; but these reinforcements were in rear of some broken ground, through which they had to pass towards the front, and, in the passage, the heavy cavalry became entangled with the infantry and artillery. Be this as it may, nothing arrived, and much time was lost. At that moment the enemy’s cavalry, of which we could count fifty squadrons, were standing in formidable array, on the shoulder of the hill of Liebertwolkwitz. The object of this display, probably was, in the event of the Allies having any troops, which might be concealed by the ground, in that part of the field, especially cavalry, to induce them to show them. A small brook or drain ran from Gossa towards the Pleisse, and in rear of the place where the two Russian regiments had taken post. Its banks happened to be swampy, and could only be passed with difficulty, and a leap across a wide drain, unless by causeways, made in two or three places by the farmers, for agricultural purposes. This obstacle was only partial, and a few hundred yards to the right, nearer Gossa, it ceased to be an impediment. The cavalry on the hill proved to be the whole corps of Latour Maubourg, amounting to upwards of 5,000 horse; Murat had taken the command, and began to descend the hill, directing his attack upon the two Russian regiments at its foot. The French advanced, in line of contiguous columns of regiments; certainly in one body only, that is, with no sort of second line or reserve. No doubt they expected to dispose of their first opponents easily, and then to attempt a more important attack on Wittgenstein’s right. The narrowness of the front to be attacked, as well as the nature of the ground, caused this powerful force to crowd into one dense mass before it came in contact with the Russian dragoons; these were overwhelmed, and driven across the swamps, or over the causeways. Many of the rearmost were killed; but the rest rallied as soon as they had crossed the brook. The lancers, who were in second line, retired by their left to another causeway, but did not cross it, and formed again. But the enemy themselves were unexpectedly checked by this unforeseen obstacle; their crowding and confusion increased; and at that moment the Russian regiment of hussars of the guard, which Wittenstein had sent to take part with the rest of the brigade, appeared in their rear. This caused a panic. The unwieldy mass became noisy, and attempted to retire; the Russian light cavalry instantly followed them. The Emperor Alexander, who stood on the hill above, seized the opportunity to send off his own escort of Cossacks of the guard, amounting to several squadrons, under Count Orloff Denissof, who passed the stream at a favorable spot near Gossa, and took the retiring mass in flank. This completed the panic, which then became a flight, and the fugitives did not draw their bridles till they had regained the protection of their infantry. Latour Maubourg received a severe wound, which disabled him for life. Murat was in great danger of being taken, and six guns fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Thus 5,000 of the French cavalry, led by Murat in person, were foiled by an insignificant obstacle. They were seized with a panic; and, for want of a second line on which to rally, and from which to take a fresh departure – a precaution without which no cavalry attack ought ever to be made – they were obliged to abandon their enterprise, and fly before a force of light cavalry, which altogether could not have amounted to 2,000 men. More space has been given to this remarkable cavalry affair than is, perhaps, proportionate to its importance; but although it failed, there are few instances of a more determined cavalry irruption, or of one attempted under more promising auspices. If it had been fully carried into effect, its consequences, at that moment, could not have failed to be disastrous to the Allies, and its complete want of success (giving due credit to the steadiness of the Russian cavalry) is manifestly to be attributed to the greatest oversight, or fault, a cavalry officer can commit – that of engaging his whole force without a second line or reserve. |
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